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A B S T R A C T   
In the spring of 2019, the Syrian civil war has entered its eight year. Although the heaviest fighting has taken 
place elsewhere, Damascus is heavily affected by the ongoing conflict. First, large parts of the eastern and 
southern fringe of the city are heavily damaged or destroyed. Second, the inflow of internally displaced persons is 
large, which has resulted in a very tense housing market in the undamaged districts. Third, the war-time political 
economy has changed the role of public and private actors in spatial planning and housing provision. This paper 
shows how the geography- and political economy of warfare has impacted upon residential patterns and housing 
practices in Damascus during the civil war. The empirical results are based on satellite imagery, policy docu-
ments and a survey among spatial planning experts and students. The results indicate that the formal response to 
the housing crisis consists of a reinforcement of the existing authoritarian neo-liberal planning model. This model 
has resulted in the construction of unaffordable luxurious showcase projects at symbolic locations. The informal 
response to the housing crisis is more pronounced. Alternative housing strategies, such as to self-construction, 
family housing, squatting and sub-letting have increased in popularity, as the formal response does not 
deliver immediate relief for war-affected households. The use of alternative housing strategies is concentrated in 
the existing informal settlements. This suggests that the civil war exacerbates housing poverty, but as well 
contributes to rising levels of socio-economic segregation.   
1. Introduction 
As a result of the ongoing war in Syria, Damascus has gained the 
reputation of a place of devastation and human suffering due to violent 
clashes between government forces and rebel militias. Although the 
armed conflict has ended in the surroundings of the capital city, it has 
left tremendous scars in the social structure and the urban fabric: a 
majority of homes in the Eastern and Southeastern fringe of the city are 
destroyed or severely damaged, whilst other parts of the city have 
absorbed nearly a million domestic migrants who fled from other parts 
of the Syrian territory (UNHCR, 2018). While the war is still ongoing in 
other parts of the country, residents repair their damaged homes, and 
consortia of public and private parties are in the middle of planning new 
housing developments (Batrawi, 2018). One thing is obvious: post-war 
Damascus will not be a replica of its past, as 1) the geography of war-
fare has reshuffled households across space, and 2) the 
political-economy of warfare has altered the power balance between 
actors involved in urban planning and housing development. In this 
paper we describe and explain geographical patterns of destruction, 
reconstruction and housing practices in Damascus in 2019, less than one 
year after the city has been brought back under government control. 
Scholarly attention for post-war reconstruction activities within the 
field of urban planning is generally limited to practices and strategies 
employed by international donors in the post-war phase (Barakat & Zyck, 
2009; Boussauw, 2012; Fitzpatrick & McWilliam, 2016; Pantuliano, 
2009). Most studies are carried out in countries where UN-Habitat and 
other international organizations have supported local governments 
with developing effective urban planning frameworks, such as Lebanon, 
Palestine, Kosovo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Iraq and Afghanistan. Their 
findings highlight the importance of more transparent and uniform 
planning regulations for the return of refugees or IDPs, reconciliation 
between population groups, local entrepreneurship and the social and 
environmental resilience of local communities (Barakat, Elkahlout, & 
Jacoby, 2004; Barakat & Zyck, 2011; Black, 2001; Cain, 2007). 
Together, these studies give insight in the strategies through which in-
ternational donors are able to successfully contribute to capacity 
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building of local planners by using participatory planning models. 
However, it could be argued that the involvement of international 
planners is ‘too little too late’. Too often a war is simply understood as a 
period of stagnation, whereas the proto- or pseudo-markets that arise 
during any conflict have a lasting impact upon the post-war development 
(see e.g. Halaf & Khoury, 1993). Many socio-spatial problems in 
post-war situations could have been prevented if a different policy path 
would have been followed from an early stage onwards (Minervini, 
2002; Brundiers & Odermatt, 2002; D’Hondt, 2012; Fitzpatrick & 
McWilliam, 2016). Focusing on geographical patterns of destruction, 
reconstruction and housing practices and their institutional causes in 
Damascus, allows us to 1) gain an understanding of reconstruction 
without much international interference, and 2) to study ‘early’ recon-
struction practices, which might contribute to the formulation of more 
effective ‘building back better’ strategies in a later stage. 
Scholars from the field of International Relations reflect on the 
involvement of foreign and international actors in post-war recon-
struction activities as a proxy to test the power balance between the 
involved domestic and foreign actors. After nearly every war, spatial 
planning is a political continuation of the conflict though which several 
involved groups make land- and development claims at the expense of 
the others. The involvement of Hezbollah in Lebanon’s post-war 
reconstruction is a textbook example (Hamieh & Mac Ginty, 2010). 
Furthermore, the creation of more compatible institutional regimes is 
often an implicit aim of the involvement of international actors. The 
‘Western approach’ that has been dominant in recent decades is criti-
cized for striving towards integration in the neo-liberal Anglosaxon 
world order by contributing to establishing a “market-based capitalist 
economic system, twinned with a political regime that is willing to 
promote and defend free market capitalism” (Guttal, 2005, p. 73). Urban 
geographers have pointed out that many states in the Middle East have 
recently developed their own, distinct model of neo-liberalism: 
authoritarian, oil-funded and with an interventionist state (Daher, 
2013; Elsheshtawy, 2008; Wippel, Bromber, & Krawietz, 2016). Before 
the war, the political economy of housing and welfare has developed in 
this direction (see e.g. Clerc, 2014; Goulden, 2011). Our study shows 
which housing patterns this regime, that has emerged in absence of 
Western interference, produces. 
In this article, we investigate geographical patterns of destruction, 
reconstruction and housing practices in Damascus, based on multiple 
sources of information, ranging from (historic) policy documents and 
official statistics to satellite imagery and a self-collected small-scale 
survey. The ongoing conflict limits the availability and reliability of 
official information. We overcome this bias by comparing information 
from multiple sources. Notwithstanding the restrictive attitude of the 
authorities, we have coordinated a small-scale survey among spatial 
planning students and experts in Damascus in 2019 (N ¼ 234). The re-
sults show which districts are perceived to be home to several alterna-
tive housing strategies. Together with ‘objective’ information from 
satellite imagery showing destruction and (re)construction, this enables 
us to document how the civil war has affected housing patterns. We 
present several maps showing which neighborhoods have absorbed 
internally displaced persons (IDP’s) and their housing practices, such as 
informal self-construction, squatting, co-residence with family mem-
bers, private renting, et cetera. We explain the changing geography of 
housing in Damascus on the basis of (historic) developments in spatial 
planning and housing policy. 
1.1. The historic origins of segregation 
The most recent pre-war sources describing ethnic- and socio- 
economic segregation in Damascus (see Clerc & Hurault, 2010; Fuc-
caro, 2003; Goulden, 2011; Naito, 1988), describe the city as a patch-
work of higher-status formally-built neighborhoods and lower-status 
informally-built neighborhoods. Whereas the city is mixed in ethnic 
terms, several neighborhoods have a historic overrepresentation of mi-
nority groups such as Assyrian and Eastern Orthodox Christians, Shia 
Muslims, Alawites, Druzes or Kurds (Fuccaro, 2003; Naito, 1988). The 
origin of these ethnic- and socio-economic segregation patterns can be 
found in the institutional approach to planning and housing followed by 
the empires that have ruled the city since its foundation 4000 years ago 
(Ancient Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Umayyads and Ottomans). 
The foundation of Syria’s current housing regime can be traced back 
to the Umayyad empire, the first Islamic rulers of Syria in the seventh 
century. After the establishment sharia-based urban legislations, the role 
of family-owned private property became a leading development prin-
ciple. The municipal authorities for spatial planning and civic affairs 
were abolished and decision-making powers decentralized to Islamic 
courts, that allowed for any form of development accepted by the 
neighbors. Because no new extensions of the city were planned, this 
resulted in a rapid and semi-formal densification of the city (Lababedi, 
2008). Large residential complexes, were several generations and family 
branches lived together emerged, fueled by the Islamic tradition that 
distributes ownership shares of the family home across all sons after the 
death of the head of the family (Burns, 2007). During the Umayyad 
period, many Christian churches (often built on the remains of Roman 
temples) were transformed into mosques, and the Christian minority 
retreated into the southwestern quarter of the old city (where the pop-
ulation is still predominantly Christian). 
The first forms of large-scale socio-economic segregation emerged 
when Syria was part of the Ottoman empire (1516–1919). After 1860, 
the Ottoman empire began a modernization campaign resulting in the 
construction of several modern neighborhoods with well-sanitized stone 
houses, connected with geometric streets, boulevards and railways. 
Examples are Sarouja and Oukaibeh north of the Old City, and Muha-
jereen as luxurious suburb located on mount Qasioun, with a view over 
the noisy and polluted Old City. Based on the feudal ‘timar system’, 
property rights developed further, which increased speculation with real 
estate (read: ownership shares in residential properties) because it 
became widely considered as a financial security for times of economic 
instability (Al-Qattan, 2002; Mundy & Smith, 2007). 
A European approach to planning and housing was introduced to 
Image 1. Damascus’ western suburb of Al-Mazzeh, built in line with modernist 
principles. Photo: Barend Wind (2018). 
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Damascus during the period of the French mandate (1919–1948). The 
colonial administration aimed to increase the quality of life and to make 
the city more ‘governable’ by putting an end to the organic growth of the 
city, using socio-spatial analyses and urban design (Khoury, 1984). The 
colonial administration introduced the distinction between formal and 
informal housing construction in a city that until then grew informally. 
However, the new regulations and plans could not put an end to the 
practice of self-construction without a building permit (Verdeil, 2012). 
In 1935, Ren�e Danger drew the first masterplan for Damascus, envi-
sioning French-style neighborhoods with a high level of public facilities. 
Malky, north of the Old City is an example of such a neighborhood, 
which has developed into a second city center (Stockhammer & Wild, 
2009). The masterplan could be enforced due to the implementation of 
several institutional changes (e.g. the Law on the Organisation and 
Construction of Cities [1933], Municipalities Financial Law [1938], and 
City Building Regulation Law [1938]). 
1.2. The Ba’athist housing model 
The spatial planning and housing policies implemented after the 
recognition of Syria as an autonomous republic in 1946 form the foun-
dation for the pre-war housing practices and segregation patterns. In the 
first decades after independence, French planners (most notably Michel 
Ecochard) remained involved in city planning in Syria. Following the 
establishment of the short-lived Ba’athist Egyptian-Syrian state in 1958, 
which was based on Arab nationalism with a socialist flavor, Ecochard 
was asked to draw a new masterplan for Damascus. His efforts continued 
after the establishment of the Syrian Arab Republic in 1963, which came 
into being after a coup d’�etat of the Syrian branch of the Ba’ath party. In 
the first decades of Ba’athist rule, many legislations surrounding spatial 
planning and housing were adopted, that have had a lasting impact on 
levels of housing quality, affordability and segregation. 
The context in which the aforementioned 1968 masterplan is writ-
ten, differs radically from the former colonial context, but is simulta-
neously a continuation of modernist city planning. The main aim has 
shifted to the “modernization of Syria according to socialist and 
collectivist options. A moderate form of market socialism emerged in 
which banks, insurance companies and industries of national impor-
tance were nationalized and a planning monopoly was established. The 
modernization of agriculture pushed people away from their rural 
homelands, and the absorption of refugees from the region (Palestine, 
Iraq, Golan Hights) intensified migration towards the bigger cities 
(Al-Haysom & Pavanello, 2011). At least on paper, planning was 
considered as an instrument to achieve balanced urban growth. The 
tandem of urbanization and industrialization yielded positive outcomes: 
the “GDP per capita increased nearly 10-fold, longevity rose by 28 per 
cent, infant mortality declined by 76 per cent, and adult literacy rose by 
40 per cent” (Goulden, 2011, p. 192). 
In order to understand the war-time changes in the housing- and 
planning regime, we provide a detailed summary of the legal backbone 
of the regulations that underpin the execution of the first post- 
independence masterplan of Damascus. First, Law 9/1974 provides 
tools to local authorities to apply the masterplan on the designated 
areas. With an additional decree they can include new ‘urban expansion 
areas’ into the existing general plans. The law on urban planning (law 5/ 
1982) requires that all cities develop general and detailed master plans: 
blue prints on the basis of which new developments can be approved or 
declined. However, as no new masterplans have been ratified after 1968, 
law 9/1974 is a much-used instrument for new extensions of the city. 
The law on expropriation (20/1983) and ‘planning and construction’ 
(law 60/1979; 26/2000; 23/2015) position the local administration in a 
favorable position to develop areas that are included in the master plan. 
The laws allow public authorities to expropriate land for new (residen-
tial or industrial) developments for the estimated agricultural value of 
the land, or to reserve a share of the private development land for public 
facilities. A recent interpretation of expropriation and planning law 
stipulates that local authorities can transform ownership rights into 
ownership shares of the new development, while keeping one third of 
the shares in public hands as a reward for the investments in public 
infrastructure such as roads, sewage, schools, etc (McAuslan, 2008). 
The framework regulating the production of housing within the 
designated extension areas in the masterplan resembles the approach 
followed by other market-socialist countries such as Yugoslavia until 
1990 (see Image 1). Within the extensions of the city envisioned in the 
Masterplan, four groups of actors could commission the construction of 
housing: (publicly-owned) companies, cooperatives, the state, and in-
dividuals. From the 1990s onwards, a fifth actor entered the scene: 
private developers. However, due to the generous opportunities for land 
expropriation and artificially low construction costs, developers of 
housing could construct relatively affordable housing. Most units are 
built in the homeownership sector (more than 75%), a minority in the 
rental sector (less than 25%). On paper, Syria has a high level of tenure 
security in the rental sector. Furthermore, rents were regulated on the 
basis of the estimated production costs of housing, while furthermore 
limiting the yearly increase in rent. McAuslan (2008) concludes that the 
legal framework based on below-market-price appropriation of land for 
new developments by local authorities has resulted in an over-
consumption and inefficient use of land, as there is no market incentive 
to build higher densities. Furthermore, the legal system provides no 
incentive to produce housing in times of housing shortage, resulting in a 
continuation of informal construction on agricultural land, outside the 
boundaries of the masterplan. 
The impact of the socialist-inspired spatial planning and housing 
model, can clearly be seen in the spatial form of the neighborhoods that 
are built between the 1960s and the 1990s (Mazzeh, Al-Mazraa, Al- 
Koussour and parts of Baramkeh). At the time, the Syrian government 
developed links with the socialist countries and Bulgarian and Polish 
experts were appointed in various administrations, including the plan-
ning one” (Verdeil, 2012). It is therefore not surprising that new city 
extensions from that period resemble the mikrorayons of 
Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. They consist of well-designed con-
crete residential blocks, profiting from maximum sun light, centered 
around collective or public court yards or commercial and cultural 
facilities. 
The insufficiencies of the socialist-inspired spatial planning and 
housing model can be concluded from the continuous increase of 
informal construction. As Damascus grew from 423.000 inhabitants in 
1955 to nearly three million in 1980, legal housing construction has 
proven to be insufficient to absorb all rural-urban migrants. To protect 
the Ghouta oasis, on which the city depends for clean water and food 
supplies, the government issues a ban on new construction in this area in 
1977, in line with Ecochard’s 1968 masterplan. However, informal 
construction continued: between 1981 and 1994, informal self- 
construction accounted for 65% of the total building activity. 
Following UN-Habitat’s definition of a slum, most informally- 
constructed neighborhoods in Damascus cannot be considered as such, 
as the building quality and sanitation situation is acceptable (Clerc & 
Hurault, 2010). Six-story buildings, constructed from concrete bricks are 
no exception in e.g. the western suburb of Mazzeh 86. In legal terms, 
inhabitants of informal settlements on private land enjoy a considerable 
degree of tenure security, as the municipality is obliged to offer alter-
native housing to the inhabitants of informal settlements in case the area 
they occupy would be expropriated and redeveloped. Prior to the 
beginning of the armed conflict, the main issue in Damascus’ 
informally-built neighborhoods was therefore not slum-formation, but 
the inadequate public facilities in these areas (as the number of schools 
and health care facilities was generally determined on the basis of a 
much smaller population) (Fernandes, 2008). 
The legal framework that came into being during the French 
mandate and the post-independence period has generated considerable 
levels of socio-economic and ethnic segregation. Naito (1988) shows 
that various waves of migrants ended up in different neighborhoods of 
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Damascus. The Christian minority, with a centuries-long presence in the 
city, kept concentrated in the eastern part of the Old City, and the 
neighborhoods north of the Old City. During the period of Syrian inde-
pendence, many Alawites moved from the coastal region to Damascus, 
as they took a more prominent role in the public service and the army. 
This resulted in an overrepresentation of Alawites in the 
formally-constructed western suburb Al-Mazzeh’ and the 
informally-constructed suburb ‘Mazzeh 86’, located next to an impor-
tant army base. Simultaneously, Druze families settled in the southern 
suburb ‘Jaramana’, whereas Palestinian refugees found a home in the 
Yarmouk camp that over time developed into a permanent (but 
informally-built) neighborhood (Naito, 1988). After the 1983 drought in 
Jazira, many Kurdish families migrated to the informally-constructed 
Akrad/Rukn Eddin suburb (for centuries the Kurdish base in Dam-
ascus) on the slope of mount Qasioun. As Syria’s housing regime is 
strongly family-based and residential mobility is limited, there is no 
evidence that patterns of residential segregation have weakened over 
time (Fuccaro, 2003). 
The Ba’athist spatial planning and housing regime has generated its 
own segregation pattern, as government employees, army personnel, 
(industrial) workers from ‘competitive’ firms, and other prioritized 
groups could get their hand on affordable apartments constructed by 
their employer (often in well-planned new developments), whereas a 
large share of the rural-urban migrants have fulfilled their housing need 
through informal housing construction. The combination of ‘sponta-
neous’ urbanization, resulting in ethnic segregation, and ‘planned’ ur-
banization, resulting in socio-economic segregation has led to 
patchwork of segregation both on the level of the metropolitan scale 
(higher status areas in the western part of the city, lower status areas in 
the eastern part of the city), and the district level (many districts are 
made up from both informal and formal neighborhoods). 
1.3. The neoliberal housing model 
Since the 1990s, the spatial planning and housing regime has 
changed as a result of liberalizations in different domains of the econ-
omy. In 1991 a law was passed to encourage foreign direct investment 
(Law 10/1991). In 2001, this law was amended to ease the requirements 
for foreigners to invest in (non-residential) real-estate (Decree 8/2007). 
Furthermore, investments in rental housing have become more attrac-
tive as “private rental laws which for so long made renting unappealing 
to property owners are being phased out, with traditional protections to 
renters disappearing [Law 6/2001]” (Goulden, 2011, p. 197). Market 
liberalizations have boosted the economy that already slumped since the 
1980s, but have as well resulted in an upswing of income inequality 
(Gini-coefficient of 35,8 in 2004). 
The partial liberalization of the economy has generated two mis-
matches: 1) between below-market price expropriation and market- 
based house prices, and 2) between low disposable incomes of average 
households and high housing costs. Whereas below-market price 
expropriation in previous times was considered to be in the public in-
terest as a tool to foster the construction of affordable housing (see for a 
critic: McAuslan, 2008), the same legal framework became a 
profit-making tool for the private developers after the turn of the cen-
tury. As a result, large investor groups from the Arab states have 
invested millions in flagship projects, of which many are not finished 
due to the outbreak of the civil war (Clerc & Hurault, 2010). The prof-
itability of rental housing has increased as a result of the deregulation of 
rent-setting (Law 6/2001). Citizens have paid a high price for the partial 
liberalization of the economy. Between 2004 and 2006, property prices 
in Syria increased with 300%, at attractive locations even far more 
(Goulden, 2011). The liberalization of the economy hampered the 
construction of affordable housing in another way: as public companies, 
cooperatives and the state (the three main providers of housing in the 
Ba’athist welfare state) found their revenues under pressure due to 
increased international competition, they could not produce the number 
of homes they did before. 
Informal construction of housing has spiked under the neoliberal 
housing regime that has emerged in the 2000s. Although Law 1/2003 
promised harsh measures on informal construction (high fines, demo-
lition, etc.), informal construction continued due to the large gap be-
tween the low average income and the high market price for legally- 
constructed housing within the perimeters of the masterplan. Goulden 
(2011) describes this as inherent to the neoliberal transformation of the 
(late) Ba’athist welfare state: economic growth due to neoliberal reforms 
could only take place by allowing more informal construction. Namely, 
the increase of property values based on the purchasing power of those 
included in the international economy fuels the GDP, whereas informal 
construction is the cheapest option to those who work in the domestic 
economy, or provide services to those who are included in the interna-
tional economy. Furthermore, by housing them in an informal housing 
market segment, their mobility on the housing market does not affect the 
prices in the formal housing market (Goulden, 2011). Clerc and Hurault 
(2010) are more nuanced in their formulation and argue that the social 
logic of welfare has come to collide with the economic logic of private 
investment. Although the economic logic has become more prominent, 
the city of Damascus has promoted the construction of affordable 
housing through social- and cooperative housing schemes in the first 
decade of the new millennium, following a ‘social logic of welfare’. 
However, these affordable housing strategies are mainly targeted at the 
middle class, and take a long time before they are realized. Therefore, 
they de facto exclude rural-urban migrants. 
During the rise of the neoliberal housing model, a new geographssy 
of housing has emerged: rising house prices and limited authorized 
housing production have pushed (domestic) migrants with low- and 
moderate incomes into informal settlements at the fringes of the city, 
including the Ghouta Oasis, Harasta and Douma (Clerc, 2014). A new 
masterplan, prepared in 2011, attempts to get a grip on informality, but 
has never approved due to the outbreak of the civil war (when the 
Lebanese company that prepared the plan left the country). The pro-
posed masterplan envisioned investment in ‘satellite cities’ in the city’s 
fringes, such as Yaafour, Dummar, Douma and Sahnaya. Furthermore, it 
proposed the westward extension of the city center, a ‘business corridor 
along the highway to Jordan, and the development of mixed-use de-
velopments south- and southwest of the extended city center. In the 
strategic plans, special attention was paid to the informal settlements. 
Some are designated to be subjected to urban renewal (demol-
ish-rebuild) whereas others are planned to be upgraded and legalized. 
The decision to upgrade or renew is based on an analysis of the quality of 
the housing units and infrastructure, carried out by the Regional Plan-
ning Commission. However, decisions about upgrading are often post-
poned (Clerc, 2014). Furthermore, strategic considerations play a role, 
as some of the informal settlements occupy spaces that are envisioned in 
the masterplan as mixed-use (internationally-competitive) de-
velopments or satellite towns. Because the Masterplan was never 
approved, the old Masterplan is changed to include some of the envi-
sioned developments. 
1.4. A geography of warfare 
In the beginning of 2011, the ‘Arab spring’ inspired protesters in 
several Syrian cities to demand more freedom of expression, institu-
tional reforms, and a revocation of the state of emergency (in place since 
1963). When these protests turned into an armed rebellion, the center of 
gravity came to be located in the informal settlements (and several 
regular neighborhoods with a low socio-economic status). This is not 
surprising, as they were home to a large group of households that had 
not profited from the economic liberalizations of the first decade of the 
21st century, while simultaneously being confronted with lower levels 
of social support and higher prices for basic necessities (Clerc, 2014). 
After an increasingly violent period of protests, a chaotic period fol-
lowed in which several armed rebel fractions took control of large parts 
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of (Greater) Damascus. In 2012, nearly all districts on the eastern side of 
the Old City (Qaboun, Jobar, Harasta, Irbin, Douma, Ghouta, etc.) came 
under rebel control, even as southern suburbs such as Yarmouk (a 
former Palestinian refugee ‘camp’), Darayya, Kafar Sousah and Babilla. 
In the years that followed, government forces have slowly pushed back 
armed rebels by generating surrounded pockets. Darayya and Kafar 
Sousah (southern suburb) and Barzeh (northeastern city district) were 
conquered relatively soon (2013), the two remaining pockets (greater 
Yarmouk and Ghouta) were fully conquered in 2018 after a long and 
devastating guerilla war with Free Syrian Army Fractions such as Tahir 
Al-Sham, Jaysh Al-Islam, Al-Rahman, Ahrar Al-Sham (in Ghouta), and 
ISIS and Al-Nusra (in Yarmouk) (Live Universal Awareness Map, 2019) 
(see Maps 1 and 2). 
Map 3 shows which administrative districts have (partly) been 
dominated by rebel fractions between 2011 and 2018. For easier 
comprehension, adjacent neighborhoods with a similar socio-economic, 
ethnic and political background are merged into larger districts (based 
on discussions with local partners), and named after the known urban 
sub-center. Map 3 gives an indication of the maximum length of the 
front line (in 2012) before government forces repulsed rebel activity to 
two pockets. Using the ‘Live Universal Awareness Map’, which docu-
ments nearly all acts of war in Syria, all districts that have continuously 
remained under government control, are indicated in green. These dis-
tricts have only suffered limited damage. Comparing satellite images 
from different moments, UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training 
and Research) has analyzed the damage density of residential properties 
in neighborhoods that have been the scene for heavy fighting (UNITAR, 
2018). We have classified neighborhoods on the basis of the most 
occurring ‘damage class’ distinguished by UNITAR, ‘ranging from 
destroyed/severely damaged, to moderately damaged and undamaged. 
In the neighborhoods classified as severely damaged more than half the 
properties is destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Since the UNITAR 
analyses do not cover the entire territory of most administrative units, 
the results are extrapolated to the entire district. For areas that are 
largely uncovered by the UNITAR analyses (Darayya, parts of Barzeh, 
and the east part of Duma/Harasta), additional information from the 
‘Live Universal Awareness Map’ has been used. Based on photographic 
evidence of the situation after the battles, we have classified these dis-
tricts in the same way as UNITAR. However, as these results can be 
considered less precise, these results are displayed as hatched in Map 3. 
Map 3 shows that especially the final rebel strongholds east of the Old 
City (Qaboun, Douma, Harasta) and south of the Old City (Yarmouk) are 
destroyed or severely damaged. The above-mentioned offensives have 
destroyed large parts of the urban fabric. The districts in the east part of 
Damascus mainly consist of collapsed housing units, interspersed by 
still-inhabited buildings with a substandard quality (either due to a low 
construction quality or due to war damage) (see Image 2). 
Satellite imagery show that informal construction has surged during 
the first years of the civil war (2011–2013), especially in the rebel- 
controlled urban fringe (Clerc, 2014). This is the result of 1) 
continuing rural-urban migration and 2) an absence of law enforcement. 
Policies that artificially suppressed the supply of informal housing prior 
to the start of the armed conflict were removed, resulting in an upswing 
of self-construction. In the later years of the civil war (2014–2018) the 
rebel-held positions have been subjected to mortar shelling, bombing 
and artillery fire of the Syrian Arab Army and allies. As a result of these 
offensives, the population of these districts has declined. First, civilian- 
and rebel casualties caused a decline of population. Second, the months 
prior to the fall of the rebel enclaves marked an exodus of inhabitants 
through ‘humanitarian corridors’. However, due to the large number of 
Map 1. Overview of the growth of Damascus, divided in four periods. Hatched units are densified in a later period. Source: Naito, 1988; Al-Qattan, 2002; Lababedi, 
2008; Verdeil, 2012; Stockhammer & Wild, 2009). 
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destructed or severely damaged housing in the former rebel-held terri-
tories (see Map 3), a considerable share of the original population has 
not returned to their former homes. Instead, they reside in camps in the 
vicinity of Damascus or with family members elsewhere. Graph 1 shows 
the population development before and during the civil war. As this 
graph is based on official statistics, derived from household registra-
tions, it is most likely a conservative estimate. Whereas the total Syrian 
population has declined as a result of refugee flows to the surrounding 
countries and Europe, the population of Damascus City has increased as 
the area has turned into a ‘safe’ haven for IDPs. The population of Rural 
Damascus, where most rebel-held areas were located, shows an 
increasing trend until 2014, but a decreasing trend afterwards. Until 
2014, informal self-construction has summited, but the war damage 
afterwards has caused a downward trend. 
Map 4 shows the geography of informal self-construction in the 
Damascus Metropolitan Region. The areas displayed in red are recog-
nized by the Regional Planning Commission as informal areas outside 
the masterplan for Damascus in 2011. Another type of informal con-
struction is informal densification in existing (legal) settlements. Dis-
tricts that are widely known for informal densification are shown as 
hatched units on Map 4. Comparing satellite images of 2011 with those 
of 2018, an analysis is made of the geographical expansion of informal 
construction outside the areas of the masterplan. These areas are dis-
played in a darker color of red. The results show that informal con-
struction was common in the southern and the eastern fringe of the city. 
This pattern is reinforced during the civil war. Whereas informal con-
struction might have been concentrated in the rebel-held eastern fringe 
during the beginning of the conflict, in later stages it appears to have 
become more common in the government-held southern fringe. 
1.5. A political economy of warfare 
Spatial planning and warfare are intrinsically connected, not just 
because spatial plans repair the damage done, but merely because they 
alter the strategic and cultural meaning of places. As Clerc (2014) ar-
gues: “conflicts are indeed exceptional times, when the bones of the 
territorial, political and economic strategic dimensions of urban plan-
ning are laid bare, [at the expense of] […] of spatial and design con-
siderations” (p.35). Organizations such as Human Rights Watch 
question the causality between war-time destruction and post-conflict 
reconstruction. HRW (2014) warns that spatial planning regulations 
are used to demolish informally constructed neighborhoods with rebel 
activity (planning as an act of warfare). They documented that between 
2012 and 2013, in Damascus security reasons have been used as a 
legitimization for the destruction of informal settlements where rebel 
fractions attacked government positions. 
Throughout the war, a new nexus between formal plans and informal 
construction has emerged, which has altered housing- and segregation 
patterns. On the formal side, the Syrian government has approved a set 
of spatial planning-related presidential decrees and laws aimed at 
reconstruction right after the beginning of the conflict. Close inspection 
shows that these endeavors should not be considered as a framework for 
reconstruction, but merely as a deepening of the fragmented neoliberal 
spatial planning approach that was followed during the first decade of 
the 21st century. In 2012, the parliament has approved Decree 66/2012 
in which two areas on the southwestern side of Damascus (Basateen Al- 
Razi and Al-Lawan) are included in the masterplan as mixed-use de-
velopments (see Map 3). Marota City (the marketing name of this new 
development) can be seen as a pilot for (post-) war-time spatial de-
velopments elsewhere in the country. The plan for Marota City envisions 
Map 2. Neighborhoods with an overrepresentation of ethno-religious minorities in Damascus. Source: Naito, 1988; Al-Haysom & Pavanello, 2011; Fuccaro, 2003; 
Burns, 2007; Al-Khalidi, Hoffmann, & Tanner, 2007; Doraï, 2008). 
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the demolition of the informally-constructed neighborhoods that occu-
pied the site, and the redevelopment into mixed-use areas of housing 
(13.000 units), offices and recreational facilities with modern architec-
tural design. The project aims to provide Damascus with a ‘showcase 
project’ that is able to compete with luxurious housing- and business 
developments elsewhere in the Arab world (Yazigi, 2017). The devel-
opment of a mixed-use development was already envisioned in the 
not-implemented masterplan, which underlines that Marota City is 
rather a continuation of existing views than a new approach to 
reconstruction. 
Two factors set the war-time urban developments apart from their 
pre-war predecessors: their underlying objectives and their organiza-
tional structure. First, whereas pre-war urban developments mainly 
served an economic interest, war-time urban developments are as much 
developed from a symbolic rationale. The construction site of Marota 
City is located in close proximity to the former frontline between the 
army and rebel factions in South Damascus. The construction of modern 
Map 3. Overview of rebel-controlled districts and the share of damaged housing in these areas.  
Image 2. War damage in Harasta. Photo: Barend Wind (2018).  
Graph 1. Population development in Syria (left-hand axis), Damascus City and 
Rural Damascus (right-hand axis) between 1960 and 2016 in millions. Source: 
CBS (2019). 
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and luxurious eye-catching developments symbolizes the emergence of a 
post-war political and economic order in which legal developers have 
reclaimed land from informal tenants (see Image 3). From an economic 
point of view, the project has a strategic location, close to the Old City 
and the popular high-status Al-Mazzeh neighborhood (where Alawites 
form the largest ethnic group). Due to the proximity to areas with 
relatively high house prices, Marota City can offer investors relatively 
high yields. Second, whereas pre-war developments were characterized 
by a distinction between public and private interests, Marota City is 
funded through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). Decree 19/2015 
allows local authorities to establish their own investment companies. In 
the case of Damascus, it has resulted in the creation of the Damascus 
Sham holding. A PPP between this holding and several private investors 
develops Marota City. The first step of the planning process has entailed 
the transformation of the property rights of the land owners into shares 
in the new development company. However, only 66% of the shares is 
distributed among the former land owners, since the Damascus Sham 
holding is entitled to 33% of the shares as a reward for the realization of 
public infrastructure. Anecdotal evidence shows that many former 
landowners have sold their shares to private investors as they could not 
afford the development costs associated with their share. The back-
ground of the private investors is unknown. It is assumed that some of 
them are ‘empty shells’ that represent the interest of wealthy domestic 
and foreign investors with ‘good connections’ (a development that 
Batrawi [2018] describes as crony capitalism). A new law (10/2018) 
stipulates that landowners need to be physically present to claim their 
share in the development within three months (later prolonged to a 
year). If a share is not claimed within due time, it legally becomes part of 
the Damascus Sham Holding. The travel restrictions due to the civil war 
have limited the number of former landowners claiming their share, 
allowing for a larger public share in the Marota City Development (NRC, 
2016). The above-mentioned framework allows the City of Damascus to 
remain in charge of spatial planning and spatial design, even now the 
financial resources have dried up due to the armed conflict.  
Reviewing the planning process underscores that symbolic reasons, 
rather than reconstruction needs, are the leading rationale behind the 
Marota City development. During the planning- and construction phase, 
the plan has been modified several times. Whereas the initial plan was to 
Map 4. Informal construction in Damascus. A distinction is made between areas recognized as informal in 2011 and informal construction of a later date. The 
hatched units are known for informal densification. 
Image 3. Arist impression of residential tower that will be built as part of the 
Marota City project. Source: Marotacity.sy (2019). 
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construct a large share of affordable housing in the first phase (directly 
adjacent to Al-Mazzeh), the final plan foresees the construction of 
13.000 apartments, of which an absolute majority will be luxury 
(100–130 M2, 950 euro/M2). The production of affordable homes has 
been transferred to the next phase (south of the initial phase in Al- 
Lawan). As a consequence, informal settlers that lived in Basateen Al- 
Razi - whose destroyed homes stood on land they did not own - bear 
the burden of the new mega project. They are displaced without alter-
native housing being provided. Anecdotal evidence shows that many 
displaced tenants have moved into new informal settlements, on the 
south edge of the new development. We draw two conclusions. First, the 
final outcome is a return to the pre-war ideal to transform this area in a 
luxury mixed-use development, only legitimized in the initial stage by a 
promise of the construction of affordable housing. Second, the change of 
plans can be considered as what De Clerc and Hurault (2010) describe as 
a clash within the state between the social logic of welfare and the 
economic logic of private investment within. 
The construction of Marota City impacts upon segregation patterns 
in Damascus. Due to high house prices, the area will hold a much higher 
socio-economic status than before. Interestingly, due to its location, a 
new corridor of high-status neighborhoods will emerge between Al- 
Mazzeh and the northern part of Kafar Sousah, taking socio-economic 
segregation to a higher geographical scale level. Simultaneously, the 
construction of Marota City reinforces sharp geographical boundaries 
between adjacent low- and high-status neighborhoods. After the con-
struction of the mega project, Damascus remains a ‘patchwork city’. 
The informal response to the housing crisis is as much as the formal 
planning approach part of the war-time political economy of housing 
and welfare. We argue that the formal approach only exists by the grace 
of rising informal housing practices. Namely, allowing informal con-
struction solves urgent housing needs and silences cries for more state 
interventions, whereas it does not equip residents with legal ownership 
rights, which keeps open future frontiers for redevelopment and asso-
ciated rent gaps. 
Informal housing practices have skyrocketed as the war has deep-
ened the mismatch between house prices and disposable incomes. 
Furthermore, the social demand for housing has increased as a result of 
the large number of IDPs (6,1 million according to UNHCR, 2018) who 
lost their home and livelihood due to warfare and sought refuge in 
Syria’s safer cities (Latakia, Tartous, Damascus). The supply of afford-
able housing has been limited, as the production costs have increased 
and the government has prioritized the construction of several luxurious 
new developments that are considered to be in the national interest such 
as Marota City. Simultaneously, the income position of many families 
has deteriorated due to the 63% GDP loss between 2011 and 2016 
(WorldBank, 2017). The destruction of production facilities, cut-off 
supply routes and international economic sanctions, have resulted in 
unemployment and a loss of purchasing power for those who remained 
in employment. Graph 2 shows the rapid decline in the GDP after 2013, 
and the increasing role of the public sector in the Syrian economy (CBS, 
2019), indicating the emergence of a pseudo-welfare state for those 
working in public service. The limited supply of legally constructed 
affordable housing within the boundaries of the masterplan, has pushed 
households that are excluded from this pseudo-welfare state (non-public 
sector employees) towards informal housing construction. Especially in 
times of high inflation (factor 10 between 2011 and 2018) investing in 
housing assets becomes much more attractive than savings or investing 
in domestic financial assets. In turn, this tightens the supply of legal 
housing even more, because many owners postpone the sale of their 
(vacant) properties, as they are waiting for house prices to rise after the 
end of the conflict. High inflation combined with uncertain future ex-
pectations has turned the Damascene housing market into a waiting 
game that results in vacancies within the legal housing stock and ex-
tensions in the informal housing stock. 
1.6. War-time housing patterns 
There is limited reliable evidence available from official sources 
about the development of the changing housing situation in Damascus 
during the civil war. Official statistics are not collected, biased or not 
available on a low geographical scale level. Due to a restrictive attitude 
of the authorities regarding data collection, our data are derived from a 
self-collected small-scale online survey among spatial planning experts 
(academics and professionals) and spatial planning students (from 
different public and private universities) within the authors’ network in 
Damascus. The survey is carried out in the spring of 2019 and has 234 
observations. As a consequence, we do not have enough observations to 
generalize claims about their neighborhood of residence. Instead of 
generalizing from individual experiences, we have asked all respondents 
to indicate which housing practices they know to be common each of the 
25 districts displayed on e.g. Map 5. These districts are collections of 
adjacent neighborhoods that are similar in the public imagery, based on 
spatial form and socio-economic status. Respondents are asked to select 
max five districts where certain socio-spatial characteristics are most/ 
least pronounced, or certain housing strategies are most/least common. 
How often a district is mentioned determines the aggregate score. We 
Graph 2. The structure of the Syrian economy between 2000 and 2016. The left-hand axis shows the percentage of each sector relative to the size of the total 
economy. The right-hand axis size of the economy relative to the size of the economy in 2000 (100). Source: CBS (2019). 
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expect that the war-time context impacts upon the reliability of the data 
in at least two ways. First, socially desirable answers might be more 
common. Second, many respondents might have only second-hand in-
formation about several districts as they have been inaccessible for 
several years when they were under different control than their own 
district. We have checked the reliability of the survey data by comparing 
the actually-observed distribution of informal construction (from satel-
lite imagery) with the distribution of informal construction indicated by 
respondents. We observed only small differences, largely based on the 
different geographical scale level of observations. 
Graph 3 indicates which housing conditions and practices have 
become more or less common during the Syrian war. The scores indicate 
the balance between respondents who observe an upward- (more com-
mon/much more common) and a downward trend (less common/much 
less common). A score close to 100% indicates that respondents unani-
mously perceive a development in the same direction, whereas a score 
close to 0% means that an equal share of respondents perceives a posi-
tive and a negative development (most likely due to differences expe-
riences in the districts they are most familiar with), or that a large share 
of the respondents does not perceive any change between 2011 and 
2019. Three headlines can be extracted from Graph 3. First, the two 
‘golden routes’ for acquiring an adequate home have become obstructed 
during the war. Purchasing a home on the market has become less 
common as a result of a low supply of housing (Graph 3: bar 1). Eco-
nomic instability has caused a severe drop in constructions completions, 
whereas the expectations that house prices will increase after the end of 
the civil war causes individuals to postpone the sale of their home if they 
are financially able to do so. Obtaining a home through one’s employer 
has become much less common (Graph 3: bar 2), as many state-owned 
companies are negatively affected by the conflict (supply routes have 
been cut off, production facilities destroyed and demand plummeted) 
which leaves them with less resources to invest in their employees’ 
homes. Second, respondents almost unanimously indicate that housing 
poverty (spending more than 50% of the household income on housing) 
has risen sharply during the conflict. More than 85% of the respondents 
perceives an increase, whereas the rest of the respondents does not 
observe a clear pattern. Third, family provision and self-construction 
(see Graph 3: bar 3 and 4) have become the main alternative housing 
practices. Resource pooling within the extended family has been an 
important way in which households from affected areas could find 
adequate shelter (e.g. by moving in with family members who live in a 
safer city). Self-construction has increased during the conflict as a 
strategy for those who fled from affected areas, and for those with a 
desire to establish an independent household. The increase of self- 
Graph 3. Perceived development of housing conditions and practices during 
the Syrissan war between 2011 and 2018, based on the percentage point dif-
ference between those who perceive a decrease and an increase. Source: Au-
thors’ survey. 
Map 5. The social status of districts in the Damascus Metropolitan Region in 2019. Source: Authors’ own survey.  
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construction is confirmed by Map 4, comparing satellite images of 2011 
and 2018. The respondents are ambiguous about the development of 
private rental, squatting and homelessness during the civil war, most 
likely due to the uneven geographical distribution of the use of these 
housing strategies. 
The use of the above-mentioned housing strategies differs between 
different districts within the Damascus Metropolitan Area. Whereas 
purchasing one’s home on the market and company provisioning have 
become less common across the board, and family-provision more 
common, the use of ‘alternative’ housing strategies, such as informal 
construction, family-housing or squatting are much more common in 
some districts than in others. Two contextual factors impact upon the 
use of the above-mentioned housing strategies in different districts. 
First, the opportunity space for several informal housing strategies is 
limited by the social status of the neighborhood, since one can expect 
that informality is less tolerated by the population in these areas. Sec-
ond, the arrival of IDPs confronts several neighborhoods with an urgent 
housing issue. One could expect that in these ‘neighborhoods of arrival’, 
‘alternative’ housing arrangements have become more prominent. 
Map 5 shows in which quintile of the status hierarchy different dis-
tricts are located. The results are based on two survey questions, asking 
respondents to select max. five districts with the lowest and the highest 
social status from a list with 25 districts. The results show that three 
districts, located at the western side of the old city, are characterized by 
a high social status: Malki, Kafar Sousah and Mazzeh. A large part of 
Malki is built as an elitist estate during Ottoman rule (Muhajereen) or 
during French rule (Abou Roumaneh), whereas Kafar Sousah and 
Dummar are constructed as modern and well-planned housing estates 
since the 1980s. Other districts with a relatively high social status are 
Mazzeh and the old city and its northern surroundings. The districts with 
the lowest social status can be found in the southern and eastern fringe 
of the city. It concerns districts with a high degree of informal housing in 
the Ghouta oasis, such as Duma, Harasta and Arbin, and the former 
Palestinian refugee camp Yarmouk and its surroundings. Map 6 shows 
that during the Syrian war, IDPs have mainly migrated to neighborhoods 
with a relatively low social status, and a high degree of informality. Two 
informal settlements close to the Old City that have remained relatively 
undamaged during the war (Mazzeh 86 and Rukn Eddin) have attracted 
many IDPs. These settlements have not increased in size, but have 
densified during recent years due to overcrowding and the addition of 
new floors. Another area that has received many IDPs during the conflict 
is located on the former frontline between government forces and rebel 
factions in the eastern side of the city: Dwellaa and Jaramana. The re-
sults clearly show that the presence of IDPs is low in districts that have 
only recently been subject to open warfare, such as Qaboun, Duma, 
Harasta, Arbin and Darayya. This means that the incoming IDPs have 
increased the pressure on the existing housing stock and the facilities in 
these neighborhoods. 
Damascus is characterized by a housing paradox: during the conflict, 
the number of vacant properties has increased due to out-migration, 
whereas the housing shortage among IDPs is enormous. Although both 
trends might be present in all districts of Damascus, they manifest 
differently in different districts. First of all, there is a group of districts 
with a low social status and a high degree of informal self-construction, 
where homes abandoned by international asylum seekers are squatted 
by incoming IDPs. Map 8 shows that squatting is especially prominent in 
several districts in the far eastern fringe of the city, such as Duma, 
Harasta, Arbin, and Yarmouk in the southern fringe. Second, there is a 
group of districts with a high social status and a planned urban design 
where the homes of international asylum seekers have remained vacant. 
Their owners are either planning to use the property after returning to 
Syria after the civil war, or wait with the sale of the property until 
property prices have risen. Map 7 shows that especially in Malki, Kafar 
Sousah North, and Dummar many inhabitable properties are vacant. It 
Map 6. Internally Displaced Persons in the Damascus Metropolitan Region in 2019. Source: Authors’ own survey.  
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does not come as a surprise that vacant housing is more common in more 
elitist neighborhoods where property rights are well-defined. It is in 
these neighborhoods that property rights are easier to guard. On the 
contrary, when inhabitants of informal settlements leave their premises, 
their place is easily taken over by new residents that have just as little 
tenure rights and tenure security. (See Map 8) 
2. Conclusion 
After eight years of civil war, Damascus is faced with an enormous 
humanitarian crisis: nearly a million internally displaced persons from 
unsafe areas have settled temporarily or permanently in the city, 
whereas a large share of the residential properties in the formerly rebel- 
held eastern and southern fringe of the city is destroyed. The social 
demand for housing is huge, whereas the market supply for housing is 
limited due to economic uncertainties. At the same time, Damascus 
reaches its environmental limits, and the absorption of many newcomers 
might overstretch the city’s social resilience. The need for binding, 
strategic visions on the spatial development of the city is larger than 
ever. This paper positions current, war-time, approaches to spatial 
planning within the political economy of housing and welfare, and re-
flects upon possible solutions. 
On the outset of the Syrian war, the country’s political economy of 
housing was a hybrid between a Ba’athist market-socialist model based 
on the expropriation of private land to construct affordable housing 
(distributed by social housing providers, cooperatives and public com-
panies), and an authoritarian neo-liberal model in which private firms 
could capture windfall profits due to favorable regulations. Informal 
construction has always been a dominant part of the Syrian housing 
regime, under the Ba’athist market-socialist model due to insufficient 
housing production, under the authoritarian neo-liberal model due to 
rapidly increasing house values. This has pushed many low-income 
rural-urban migrants to Damascus’ informally-built fringe. 
War-time urban developments in Damascus cannot be considered as 
reconstruction projects. Instead, they are a continuation of the earlier 
initiated authoritarian neo-liberal planning model, supplemented by a 
new set of laws and decrees that allow local authorities to form private- 
public partnerships to share the financial benefits of new investments 
with private investors. The largest luxurious mixed-use development, 
Marota City is a showcase project to underline the emergence of a new 
political and economic order on a location of civic discontent during the 
initial phase of the conflict. The current developments are problematic 
due to two reasons. First, they displace informal settlers with limited 
compensation, whereas former land owners have limited possibilities to 
receive a share of the development gain. Second, the new developments 
are luxurious and unaffordable for those who are in need of housing 
most: families that lost their home due to warfare. Informal housing 
strategies are the most common solution to the war-time housing crisis. 
During the conflict, informal construction has spiked in the southern and 
northern fringe of the city. Furthermore, centrally-located informal 
settlements such as Mazzeh 86 and Rukn Eddin have densified to host 
IDPs. Squatting is widespread in informally constructed settlements 
where residents have fled their premises. In elitist neighborhoods where 
property rights are well-defined, housing remains vacant when owners 
have moved abroad, speculating on higher house prices in the future. 
Although Damascus is moderately mixed in terms of socio-economic 
status, the difference in housing strategies found in the informal settle-
ments compared to planned neighborhoods aggravate socio-spatial in-
equalities. We argue that formal neo-liberal urban developments and the 
expansion of informal housing practices are two sides of the same coin. 
Formal urban developments entitle those with ‘good contacts’ to a share 
of future house price gains, whereas the rise of informal construction 
alleviates urgent housing needs for those without many resources, 
Furthermore, the existence of large informal settlements right next to 
Map 7. Vacant but inhabitable properties in the Damascus Metropolitan Region in 2019. Source: Authors’ own survey.  
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prestigious new urban developments yields the promise of ever shifting 
(and for investors: profitable) rent gaps, until Damascus’ fragmented 
pattern of socio-economic segregation becomes homogenized. 
Before the onset of the civil war, international and Syrian experts 
have advised to modernize the planning system in order to be able to 
accommodate social, economic and environmental trends in a more 
efficient, effective and equitable manner. The need for a new strategic 
vision to replace Michel Ecochard’s 1968 (still valid!) masterplan is 
more urgent than ever. However, especially the instruments to realize 
such a vision deserve scrutiny. Whereas international experts prior to 
the start of the armed conflict have emphasized the importance of a 
market-based expropriation system to give landowners a fair share of the 
development gain, market regulations that limit private profits to foster 
housing affordability seem more useful in the post-war situation. Within 
the current neoliberal approach to planning the government faces an 
insurmountable dilemma: policies that increase housing production by 
increasing the profitability for investors (and the state), decrease the 
affordability for potential tenants and homeowners and reinforce socio- 
spatial polarization. The social demand for housing can only be absor-
bed by formal housing production when civil society organizations and 
citizen cooperatives are engaged in ‘building back better’ approaches, in 
which they collectively invest in the improvement of their homes in a 
non-commercial fashion. The state might support these initiatives 
through a conditional legalization scheme, supplemented by stricter rent 
price regulations. Although a move towards a more collectivist planning 
approach with room for citizens would fit Syria’s political heritage and 
contribute to post-conflict reconciliation and trust-building, it remains a 
very unlikely path. A model with profitable showcase projects, sur-
rounded by informal settlements that are neither upgraded nor rede-
veloped (and therefore easy to expropriate) seems to become a 
cornerstone of Syria’s post-war development model. 
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